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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN AN EBAY MARKETPLACE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY’S 
RADIR WHEELS DECISION TO EXTEND LIABILITY UNDER 
THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT TO INDIVIDUAL 
EBAY SELLERS 
William J. Diggs∗ 
I.INTRODUCTION 
The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA)
1
 is “one of the 
strongest consumer-protection laws in the nation.”
2
  In pertinent part, 
the CFA’s general antifraud provision makes unlawful “[t]he act, use 
or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial 
practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresen-
tation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any 
material fact . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any 
merchandise or real estate.”
3
 
Since the CFA’s adoption in 1960, the judiciary and legislature 
have been constantly expanding the CFA to provide broader and 
stronger consumer protection.
4
  But technological developments of 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, such as Internet-
auction powerhouse eBay, present new questions about the protec-
tion that the CFA affords consumers. 
An Internet auction occurs where an item—usually a good, but 
sometimes a service—is offered for sale via an Internet-auction Web 
site, through which potential buyers bid against one another to pur-
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 1 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to -184 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009). 
 2 Press Release, Governor William T. Cahill, Assembly Bill No. 2402, 1 (June 29, 
1971) (on file with author). 
 3 § 56:8-2. 
 4 See Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 364–65 (N.J. 1997). 
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chase the item.
5
  Two forms of Internet-auction Web sites have been 
established: business-to-consumer Internet-auction Web sites and 
consumer-to-consumer Internet-auction Web sites.
6
  A business-to-
consumer Internet-auction Web site exists where the Internet-auction 
Web site physically possesses, accepts payment for, and delivers the 
item after purchase.
7
  A consumer-to-consumer Internet-auction Web 
site exists where the seller, not the Internet-auction Web site, physi-
cally possesses the item, and once the auction ends, the seller and 
purchaser deal directly with one another regarding payment and de-
livery.
8
 
In 1995, eBay became one of the pioneers of consumer-to-
consumer Internet-auction Web sites, which have now become a 
staple form of e-commerce.
9
  Nearly fifteen years later, “[w]ith more 
than 88 million active users globally, eBay is the world’s largest online 
marketplace, where practically anyone can buy and sell practically an-
ything.”
10
  Thus, “[w]ith a diverse and passionate community of indi-
viduals and small businesses, eBay offers an online platform where 
millions of items are traded each day.”
11
  As eBay and similar e-
commerce facilitators continue to grow in popularity, “courts are, not 
surprisingly, faced with the task of applying settled law to modern 
technological dilemmas.”
12
 
Indeed, Internet-auction Web sites provide swindlers yet another 
means through which to perpetrate fraud.
13
  Because consumers 
make millions of Internet-auction purchases each day,
14
 “[s]cammers 
are attracted to eBay like moths to a flame,” and “unsuspecting bid-
ders are the main prey of the crooks.”
15
  To be sure, Internet-auction 
 
 5 See INTERNET FRAUD COMPLAINT CTR., INTERNET AUCTION FRAUD 5 (2001), availa-
ble at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps50672/AuctionFraudReport.pdf. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See Sayeedi v. Walser, 835 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2007). 
 10 eBay, Inc., Who We Are, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Nov. 14, 
2009). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Sayeedi, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 842. 
 13 See INTERNET FRAUD COMPLAINT CTR., supra note 5, at 5. 
 14 See eBay, Inc., Who We Are, supra note 10. 
 15 Frank Fortunato, Fraud on eBay: Causes and Cures, ECOMMERCE-GUIDE 
ESSENTIALS, Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.ecommerce-guide.com/essentials/ebay/ 
article.php/3652611; see also eBay, What To Do When You Don’t Receive Your Item 
or It’s Not as Described, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/item-not-received.html 
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fraud, which accounted for nearly thirty-six percent of all Internet-
crime complaints in 2007, constitutes by far the most reported Inter-
net crime.
16
  Notably, eighty-four percent of Internet-auction fraud is 
committed by a seller who is not engaged in the trade or business of 
making sales of the type of which he made on eBay (an “individual 
seller” or “individual eBay seller”); only the remaining sixteen per-
cent is committed by a seller who is engaged in the trade or business 
of making sales of the type of which he made on eBay (a “merchant 
seller” or “merchant eBay seller”).
17
 
Scamming sellers perpetrate Internet-auction fraud in six main 
ways: (1) non-delivery, which occurs where the seller places up for bid 
an item that does not exist and, consequently, is never delivered to 
the purchaser after the purchaser pays for the item; (2) misrepresen-
tation, which occurs where the seller purposefully deceives the buyer 
as to the item’s true value by, for example, listing false information or 
using false or altered photographs of the item; (3) triangulation, 
which occurs where the seller markets stolen merchandise to an un-
suspecting buyer through an Internet-auction Web site; (4) fee stack-
ing, which occurs where the seller, after the close of an auction, adds 
hidden charges, such as separate costs for postage, handling, or ship-
ping, so that the buyer, consequently, pays more than he anticipated; 
(5) black-market-good sale, which occurs where the seller’s item ac-
tually is an unauthorized imitation or copy of the kind of good that 
the seller purports it to be; and (6) shill bidding, which is intentional 
phony bidding by either the seller or the seller’s accomplice to pur-
posefully increase the price of the seller’s own item.
18
 
No CFA specific antifraud provision or regulation promulgated 
under the CFA expressly relates to Internet-auction sales.  Nonethe-
less, a merchant eBay seller who commits Internet-auction fraud 
would unquestionably be subject to liability under the CFA’s general 
antifraud provision.
19
  And the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s land-
mark holding in Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc., made the CFA’s general an-
tifraud provision the first consumer-protection law in the nation to 
 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (delineating procedures for buyers who may have been 
defrauded).   
 16 See INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., 2007 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2007_IC3Report.pdf. 
 17 See INTERNET FRAUD COMPLAINT CTR., supra note 5, at 10. 
 18 See id. at 6–7. 
 19 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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explicitly extend liability to individual eBay sellers.
20
  Specifically, the 
court articulated that “[t]here is no doubt that” an individual eBay 
seller “himself satisfies the statutory definition of ‘person’” such that 
he may be held liable under the CFA’s general antifraud provision.
21
 
This Comment will analyze the court’s holding in Radir Wheels to 
assess whether the court was correct to extend to individual eBay sel-
lers liability under the CFA’s general antifraud provision.
22
  Part II of 
 
 20 See 969 A.2d 1069, 1071 n.1, 1078 (N.J. 2009). 
 21 Id. at 1079. 
 22 At the outset, noting the issues on which this Comment does not center is also 
important.   
One issue that this Comment does not address is the question of what is the best 
means by which to regulate Internet-auction fraud.  Governance of Internet-auction 
sellers and Web sites potentially may be best addressed through federal statutes and 
regulations enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  See generally Shawn T. Hynes, 
Comment, Stopping Another Phantom Menace: Using the Commerce Clause to Force States to 
Police Online Auction Shill Bidding or Face Congressional Mandates, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
763 (2003).  This Comment, however, is concerned only with whether the Radir 
Wheels court correctly concluded that the CFA should be one of the ways in which 
consumers are protected. 
Another issue that this Comment does not address is New Jersey courts’ personal 
jurisdiction over individual eBay sellers.  New Jersey courts clearly would have gener-
al jurisdiction over an individual eBay seller who violates the CFA while residing in 
New Jersey.  See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & 
n.9 (1984).  But whether New Jersey courts would have personal jurisdiction over an 
individual eBay seller who, while residing outside of New Jersey, violates the CFA in a 
sale to a New Jersey consumer is not so obvious.  Assuming purposeful availment, 
specific jurisdiction would be warranted because a New Jersey consumer’s suit against 
an individual eBay seller would be “based on a contract which had substantial con-
nection with th[e] State.”  McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).  But 
an individual eBay seller’s purposeful availment of New Jersey’s laws and privileges 
may be difficult to prove.  Unless evidence shows that before the sale the individual 
eBay seller knew that the consumer resided in New Jersey, the individual eBay seller’s 
purposeful availment “of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State” may be lacking.  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  Despite this 
uncertainty, the personal jurisdiction issue is not the focal point of this Comment, 
which concentrates only on whether the court correctly held that the CFA substan-
tively, not procedurally, applies to individual eBay sellers. 
A final issue that this Comment does not address is choice-of-law complications 
that could arise where one of the parties resides outside of New Jersey and the other 
resides within the State.  Assuming no choice-of-law agreement between the parties, 
the issue would then be whether the fraudulent transaction should be governed by 
the CFA or by the consumer-protection law of the state or country of the party who 
resides outside of New Jersey.  Regardless of which of the two parties lives in New Jer-
sey, New Jersey courts would likely apply the CFA in all cases in which a consumer 
brings a CFA claim.  See Smith v. Alza Corp., 948 A.2d 686, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2008) (stating that in assessing choice-of-law issues, two steps are involved: (1) 
absent an actual conflict between the interested states’ laws, New Jersey courts apply 
New Jersey substantive law; and (2) if such actual conflict exists, New Jersey courts 
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this Comment will discuss the CFA’s history.  Part III will articulate 
the current state of the CFA and how the CFA’s provisions function 
to protect consumers.  Part IV will detail the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey’s decision in Radir Wheels.  Finally, Part V will argue that the 
Radir Wheels decision was a necessary and proper extension of the 
CFA’s general antifraud provision. 
II.THE CFA’S HISTORY 
In the 1950s, the New Jersey Legislature “recognized that the de-
ception, misrepresentation, and unconscionable practices engaged in 
by professional sellers seeking mass distribution of many types of con-
sumer goods frequently produce an adverse effect on large segments 
of disadvantaged and poorly educated people.”
23
  Thus, in 1960, the 
legislature enacted the CFA to battle against the increasing preva-
lence of consumer fraud.
24
  The sponsor statement that accompanied 
the CFA articulated that the legislature, through the CFA, intended 
to confer on the attorney general the power “to investigate and pro-
hibit fraudulent advertising and selling practices,” which the legisla-
ture recognized had “caused extensive damage to the public.”
25
  Orig-
inally, the attorney general enforced the CFA exclusively through his 
broad powers under the CFA to investigate, subpoena, and seek both 
injunctions to terminate prohibited conduct and restitution orders to 
make whole any consumers harmed by conduct in violation of the 
CFA.
26
  In 1967, the legislature created the Office of Consumer Pro-
tection to provide the means through which the attorney general car-
ried out his duties under the CFA.
27
 
 
apply the substantive law of “‘the state with the greatest interest in governing the par-
ticular issue’” (quoting Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187, 1187 (N.J. 1986))).  Be-
cause the CFA is one of the nation’s most protective consumer-fraud laws, see Press 
Release, supra note 2, at 1, New Jersey courts would likely apply the CFA even if a 
conflict exists because New Jersey would have the greater interest in the issue.  None-
theless, this Comment does not address choice-of-law considerations and is con-
cerned only with the court’s holding that where the CFA does apply, the CFA go-
verns individual eBay sellers.      
 23 Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 648 (N.J. 1971). 
 24 See Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 460 (N.J. 1994).   
 25 Sharon Bossemeyer, Re-examining New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act: Loopholes for 
Professionals?, 7 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 45, 45 (1983) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to 
-25 (West 1964 & Supp. 1982)). 
 26 See Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 541 A.2d 1063, 1067 (N.J. 1988). 
 27 See Bossemeyer, supra note 25, at 47 (stating that the Office of Consumer pro-
tection was created to “attempt to give substance to the legislative mandate that gov-
ernment be responsive to the needs of the public”). 
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In 1970, however, only ten years after the legislature enacted the 
CFA, independent researchers determined that the CFA did not live 
up to its promised level of consumer protection.
28
  The researchers 
specifically found that 
New Jersey consumers have been short-changed by [New Jersey’s] 
government.  They have not been served well by the legislature, 
which has repeatedly rejected tough new measures designed to 
strengthen the position of the consumer in the marketplace.  At 
the same time, it has denied the executive branch adequate funds 
to enforce the consumer laws now on the books.  Likewise, the 
governors and attorneys general of both the past and present ad-
ministrations have allowed the Office of Consumer Protection, for 
which they are responsible, to assemble an unskilled staff, to op-
erate with chronic inefficiency, and to vitiate the laws against 
fraud through timid, weak enforcement.
29
 
Finding the CFA to be ineffective primarily because it was left to 
be enforced solely by the attorney general through the Office of Con-
sumer Protection, the researchers recommended that the legislature 
create a private cause of action through which consumers themselves 
could enforce the CFA.
30
  Additionally, the researchers asserted that 
the legislature should provide to consumers who bring a private cause 
of action under the CFA the right to collect from defendants in 
breach of the CFA treble damages, attorney’s fees, and the costs for 
bringing suit.
31
  The researchers believed that doing so would “in-
duc[e] the private bar to enter the fight against consumer fraud,” 
and consequently, consumers “would no longer have to stand by hel-
plessly while their claims of fraud languished in the Office of Con-
sumer Protection.”
32
 
In 1971, one year after the researchers published their report 
and recommendations, the legislature responded by enacting exactly 
the type of provision for which the researchers called—a private 
cause of action that required the courts to award to a consumer who 
brought a successful CFA claim treble damages, attorney’s fees, and 
costs.
33
  The legislature enacted the amendment to effectuate five 
 
 28 See id. at 47–48. 
 29 CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF PUB. ISSUES, NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: 
A PROMISE UNFULFILLED 55 (1970). 
 30 See Bossemeyer, supra note 25, at 47–48. 
 31 See id. 
 32 CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF PUB. ISSUES, supra note 29, at 67.  
 33 See Bossemeyer, supra note 25, at 48.  In the 1971 amendment to the CFA, the 
legislature also granted to the attorney general the “authority to seek restoration of 
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main purposes, all of which are substantially similar to the research-
ers’ reasons for their recommendations: (1) to make the victim whole 
through compensatory damages;
34
 (2) to punish CFA violators 
through treble damages;
35
 (3) to induce competent private counsel to 
pursue CFA claims through the provision for attorney’s fees;
36
 (4) to 
make access to the courts easier for consumers, who thereafter could 
use the private cause of action; and (5) to reduce the Office of Con-
sumer Protection’s burden in ensuring compliance with the CFA by 
permitting consumers to privately pursue enforcement actions.
37
  Be-
cause of both the CFA’s current provisions and New Jersey courts’ 
liberal construction of those provisions, the CFA is one of the strong-
est consumer-protection statutes in the United States.
38
 
III.THE CFA’S CURRENT FORM 
A. Unlawful Practices Under the CFA 
A person violates the CFA when that person commits an “unlaw-
ful practice” under the CFA.
39
  The CFA enumerates four types of vi-
olations: “(1) affirmative acts; (2) knowing omissions; . . . (3) regula-
tory violations”;
40
 and (4) violations of specific antifraud provisions.
41
  
The first two categories of unlawful practices, affirmative acts and 
knowing omissions, are derived from the CFA’s general antifraud 
provision; the third category, regulatory violations, flows from viola-
tions of the regulations promulgated under the CFA.
42
  The fourth 
 
money or property to a defrauded consumer.”  Id.  Additionally, in that same year, 
the Office of Consumer Protection was replaced by the Division of Consumer Affairs 
in the Department of Law and Public Safety.  See id. at 47 n.15.  
 34 See Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 741 A.2d 591, 593 (N.J. 1999); see 
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001) (providing for “reasonable attorneys’ fees, 
filing fees and reasonable costs of suit”). 
 35 See Lettenmaier, 741 A.2d at 593; see also § 56:8-19 (stating that, under the CFA, 
“the court shall, in addition to any other appropriate legal or equitable relief, award 
threefold the damages sustained by any person in interest”). 
 36 See Lettenmaier, 741 A.2d at 593. 
 37 See Press Release, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 38 See Lisa J. Trembly & Michael F. Bevacqua, Back to the Future with the Consumer 
Fraud Act: New Jersey Sets the Standard for Consumer Protection, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 
193, 194 (2004).   
 39 Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 459 (N.J. 1994). 
 40 Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 872 A.2d 783, 790 (N.J. 2005). 
 41 See infra note 58. 
 42 See Cox, 647 A.2d at 462 (articulating that in regard to the first three categories 
of CFA violations, “[t]he first two are found in the language of [N.J. STAT. ANN. §] 
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category, violations of specific antifraud provisions, is based on 
breach of any of the CFA’s numerous specific antifraud provisions, 
which define practices in certain consumer-protection fields that con-
stitute automatic violations of the CFA.
43
  Notably, the CFA’s general 
antifraud provision is not trumped by and applies alongside any spe-
cific antifraud provisions or regulations in regard to a particular area 
of consumer protection.
44
  Moreover, the CFA’s general antifraud 
provision, specific antifraud provisions, and regulations are not nulli-
fied by and apply simultaneously with any and all other statutes and 
regulations that relate to consumer protection unless either of the 
only two notable CFA exceptions applies.
45
 
1. The General Antifraud Provision 
The CFA’s general antifraud provision sets forth two types of un-
lawful practices: affirmative acts and knowing omissions.
46
  To prove 
that an affirmative act violates the CFA’s general antifraud provision, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate only that the defendant engaged in “un-
conscionable commercial practices, fraud, deception, false promise, 
false pretense, [or] misrepresentation.”
47
  Affirmative-act violations 
are strict-liability offenses, and thus, the plaintiff need not prove in-
tent on the part of the perpetrator.
48
 
To establish that a knowing omission violates the CFA’s general 
antifraud provision, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant en-
gaged in a “knowing[] concealment, suppression, or omission of any 
 
56:8-2 [(West 2001)], and the third is based on regulations enacted under [N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §] 56:8-4” (West 2001)). 
 43 See infra note 58. 
 44 See infra notes 56, 57, 59 and accompanying text. 
 45 See Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 955 A.2d 940, 952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2008) ( “When analyzing whether a transaction is covered by the CFA, it should or-
dinarily be assumed that the CFA applies to the covered practice.  The presumption . 
. . applies, even in the face of other existing sources of regulation, [to] preserve[] the 
Legislature’s determination to effect a broad delegation of enforcement authority to 
combat consumer fraud.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
infra Part III.C. 
 46 See Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 872 A.2d 783, 790 (N.J. 2005). 
 47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2001); see also Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 
A.2d at 462  (stating that because the CFA disjunctively prohibits “any unconsciona-
ble commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, [and] mi-
srepresentation,” a plaintiff need prove only one of the proscribed acts to demon-
strate a CFA violation). 
 48 See Thiedemann, 872 A.2d at 791 (stating that because intent need not be prov-
en, “[a]n ‘affirmative act’ may be established by showing that a defendant’s actions 
constituted one of the stated prohibited practices”). 
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material fact.”
49
  In contrast to violations under the affirmative-act 
prong, the perpetrator’s intent is essential for CFA violations pre-
mised on knowing omissions because the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendant knowingly made the omission.
50
 
2. The Regulations 
The CFA’s third category of unlawful practices is violation of the 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the CFA.
51  The CFA provides 
the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs with authority to 
enact regulations to effectuate both the CFA’s general antifraud pro-
vision and the CFA’s specific antifraud provisions.
52
  Accordingly, the 
Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs has enacted many such 
CFA regulations.
53
  The regulations carry the legal weight of the CFA, 
and therefore, any regulatory violation constitutes a breach of the 
CFA.
54
  Further, because any party subject to any regulation promul-
gated under the CFA is presumed to be familiar with the regulation, 
the CFA regulations are strict liability, and therefore, intent is not ne-
cessary to prove a violation.
55
 
The CFA regulations purport to more specifically effectuate the 
CFA’s general antifraud provision and specific antifraud provisions, 
even if a CFA regulation applies to the area of consumer protection 
in which the CFA violation is asserted.
56
  Thus, the CFA regulations do 
 
 49 § 56:8-2; see also Cox, 647 A.2d at 462. 
 50 See Cox, 647 A.2d at 459. 
 51 See id. at 462; Administrative Rules of the Division of Consumer Affairs, N.J. 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 13:45A-1.1 to -29.1 (2008). 
 52 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.32 (West Supp. 2009). 
 53 See Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 390 A.2d 566, 568 (N.J. 1978). 
 54 See Cox, 647 A.2d at 459 (stating that the regulations promulgated under the 
CFA are backed by authority of law). 
 55 See id. at 462. 
 56 See Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 696 A.2d 546, 551, 553–54 
(N.J. 1997); see, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:45A-1.1(a) (2008) (“Without limiting any 
other practices which may be unlawful under the [CFA’s general and specific anti-
fraud provisions], this rule makes unlawful thereunder some specific practices in the 
mail order or catalog business.”); id. § 13:45A-10.5 (“Without foreclosing the prose-
cution of any other practices which may be unlawful under the [CFA’s general and 
specific antifraud provisions], any violations of the provisions [regulating servicing 
and repairing of home appliances] shall be subject to the sanctions contained in [the 
CFA].”); id. § 13:45A-15.4 (providing specific remedies, which apply “[i]n addition to 
any other remedy provided by the [CFA’s general and specific antifraud provisions],” 
for violation of the regulations promulgated in regard to disclosure of refund poli-
cies in retail establishments); id. § 13:45A-23.2(a) (stating that “[w]ithout limiting 
the prosecution of any other practices which may be unlawful under the [CFA’s gen-
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not limit the ability of the consumer to seek additional or alternative 
protection of the CFA’s general antifraud provision or specific anti-
fraud provisions or any other remedy at law that may be available.
57
 
3. The Specific Antifraud Provisions 
Breach of one of the CFA’s specific antifraud provisions consti-
tutes the CFA’s fourth category of violations.
58
  The CFA’s specific an-
tifraud provisions consist of numerous “supplemental provisions” 
adopted by the legislature to “define very specific unlawful practices” 
under the CFA.
59
  Because the CFA’s specific antifraud provisions ap-
ply alongside the CFA’s general antifraud provision and correspond-
ing regulations, when a consumer pursues a claim that falls within an 
area in which the legislature has enacted a specific antifraud provi-
sion, the consumer nonetheless may invoke the protection of any and 
all other applicable CFA provisions—including the general antifraud 
provision, other specific antifraud provisions, and relevant regula-
tions—as well as any other applicable legal remedy outside of the 
CFA.
60
 
B. Standing Requirements 
The standing requirements to pursue a CFA claim differ de-
pending on whether the attorney general or a consumer initiates the 
 
eral and specific antifraud provisions], . . . the following acts or omissions shall be 
deceptive practices in the conduct of the business of a watercraft repair dealer”). 
 57 See Lemelledo, 696 A.2d at 551, 553–54. 
 58 The specific antifraud provisions are sprinkled throughout the entirety of the 
CFA following the CFA’s general antifraud provision.  These specific antifraud provi-
sions provide express articulations of what constitutes an “unlawful act” per se in 
their respective consumer-protection areas, but the specific antifraud provisions do 
so without limiting what may otherwise qualify as an “unlawful act” in those areas un-
der the CFA’s general antifraud provision, other specific antifraud provisions, or the 
regulations promulgated under both the general and specific antifraud provisions.  
See, e.g., Refund Policy Disclosure Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.14 to -2.21 (West 
2001); Raincheck Policy Disclosure Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.28 to -2.31 (West 
2001 & Supp. 2009); Unit Price Disclosure Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-21 to -25 
(West 2001); Kosher Food Consumer Protection Act, id. §§ 56:8-61 to -66; Used Car 
Lemon Law, id. §§ 56:8-67 to -80; Industrial Hygienist Truth in Advertising Act, id. §§ 
56:8-81 to -85; Pet Purchase Protection Act, id. §§ 56:8-92 to -97; Halal Food Consum-
er Protection Act, id. §§ 56:8-98 to -103; Safety Professional Truth in Advertising Act, 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-113 to -116 (West Supp. 2009); Contractors’ Registration Act, 
id. §§ 56:8-136 to -148. 
 59 Bossemeyer, supra note 25, at 48–59. 
 60 See Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 696 A.2d 546, 551, 553–54 
(N.J. 1997). 
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action.  For the attorney general to have standing under the CFA, the 
attorney general need only prove that the CFA has been violated; the 
attorney general is not required to prove that any consumer has ac-
tually been harmed by the unlawful act.
61
  But for a consumer to have 
standing to pursue a private cause of action under the CFA, the con-
sumer must show not only that an unlawful act occurred but also that 
the unlawful conduct caused the consumer an “ascertainable loss.”
62
  
New Jersey courts have held that to show an ascertainable loss, the 
consumer must set forth specific evidence from which the fact finder 
could reasonably determine that the consumer suffered actual loss.
63
 
Consequently, although the attorney general may bring actions 
seeking injunctions for purely prospective relief, an individual con-
sumer may not do so. 
64
  Even if seeking an injunction in hopes of 
preventing future harm, the requirement that the consumer first 
demonstrate an ascertainable loss necessitates that the consumer also 
be seeking retroactive relief.
65
 
C. Exceptions 
The CFA’s provisions are exceptionally broad.  The general anti-
fraud provision, the specific antifraud provisions, and the regulations 
generally apply “even in the face of other existing sources of regula-
tion.”
66
  But the CFA’s provisions’ far-reaching application is subject 
to two notable limitations.
67
 
1. The Regulatory-Conflict Exception 
The first exception to the CFA is the regulatory-conflict excep-
tion.  Under the regulatory-conflict exception, the CFA’s provisions 
do not govern a given commercial practice where “a ‘real possibility’ 
 
 61 See Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 541 A.2d 1063, 1067 (N.J. 1988). 
 62 Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 872 A.2d 783, 791 (N.J. 2005) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  
 63 See id. at 792–93.  Notably, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Thiedemann de-
scribed how New Jersey courts have consistently struggled to define the exact mean-
ing of ascertainable loss.  See id.    
 64 See id. at 792. 
 65 See id. 
 66 Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 955 A.2d 940, 952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2008). 
 67 These two exceptions are the only exceptions that are worth noting in detail.  
On other very rare occasions, however, New Jersey courts have found other minute 
CFA exceptions.  See, e.g., Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 390 A.2d 566, 569 
(N.J. 1978) (holding that the CFA does not apply to a public-utility company). 
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of conflict would exist if the CFA were to apply to a particular prac-
tice, regardless of the number of agencies with regulatory jurisdiction 
over that practice.”
68
  This regulatory-conflict exception is based on 
the “understanding that the Legislature does not intentionally subject 
regulated entities to clearly conflicting administrative regimes.”
69
 
Even where other regulation exists, courts must begin with the 
presumption that the CFA applies“because of the strong and sweep-
ing legislative remedial purpose apparent in the CFA.”
70
  Indeed, the 
CFA calls for such an assumption because it “explicitly states that the 
‘rights, remedies and prohibitions’ that it creates are cumulative to 
those created by other sources of law.”
71
  To overcome the presump-
tion that the CFA’s provisions apply, “a direct and unavoidable con-
flict” must exist between the CFA and the other regulatory 
scheme(s).
72
  Establishing “a direct and unavoidable conflict” requires 
proving “that the other source or sources of regulation deal specifi-
cally, concretely, and pervasively with the particular activity, implying 
a legislative intent not to subject parties to multiple regulations that, 
as applied, will work at cross-purposes.”
73
  The CFA’s application is 
negated under the regulatory-conflict exception only by such a strong 
showing because if the CFA’s applicability could be “too easily over-
come, the statute’s remedial measures may be rendered impotent as 
primary weapons in combatting [sic] clear forms of fraud simply be-
cause those fraudulent practices happen also to be covered by some 
other statute or regulation.”
74
 
2. The Learned-Professionals Exception 
The second exception to the CFA is the learned-professionals 
exception.  Under the learned-professionals exception, “learned pro-
fessionals in respect of the rendering of professional services are insu-
lated from the CFA.”
75
  Learned professionals include, among others, 
“lawyers, physicians, dentists, accountants[,] engineers,”
76
 and real-
 
 68 Lemelledo v. Benefit Mgmt. Corp., 696 A.2d 546, 553 (N.J. 1997). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.13 (West 2001)). 
 72 Id. at 554. 
 73 Id. (emphasis added). 
 74 Lemelledo, 696 A.2d at 554. 
 75 Macedo v. Dello Russo, 840 A.2d 238, 242 (N.J. 2004). 
 76 Id. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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estate brokers.
77
  The learned-professionals exception is deeply rooted 
in CFA jurisprudence; the legislature has taken no action to alter the 
path of this four-decade-old court-established exception.
78
 
The learned-professionals exception is based on the notion that 
although learned professionals clearly provide services to the public, 
those “services does [sic] not fall into the category of consumerism.”
79
  
Further, the CFA need not govern learned professionals because they 
are already subject to “comprehensive regulation by the relevant reg-
ulatory bodies” of their professions.
80
 
IV.REAL V. RADIR WHEELS, INC.
81
 
In 2009, the protections offered by the CFA entered a new 
realm.  In Radir Wheels, the Supreme Court of New Jersey faced the 
issue of whether the CFA’s general antifraud provision reaches so far 
as to regulate an eBay transaction between a consumer and an in-
state individual eBay seller.
82
 
The plaintiff in Radir Wheels, Lyle Real, was a Missouri resident 
who, while contemplating purchasing a vintage car, came across the 
following Internet-auction advertisement on eBay: 
1970 Corvette Convert[i]ble.  Matching numbers, One owner 
Car, 350/300 HP 4 speed, Good Frame, New exh[au]st system, 
Power steering, Soft top is good.  New Carpet.  Runs Strong, Orig-
inal rallys, Original radio/cassette.  Title is original from 06/24 
1970.  If you have any Questions[,] please feel free to give us a call 
at [number removed].  Thanks and good luck!
83
 
The advertisement further described the vehicle’s condition as fol-
lows: “Needs door hinge pins, Radiator support, original interior is ok 
but seats are a little worn.  Painted once now has a few chips.  Wind-
shield has small crack in the lower left corner.”
84
  Additionally, the 
advertisement stated that a “10% deposit required within 5 days of 
 
 77 See Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473, 481 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).  Not-
ably, the Neveroski court also held that the CFA’s general antifraud provision does not 
apply to an individual seller’s sale of his personal residence.  See id.; see also infra Part 
V.B.2. 
 78 See Macedo, 840 A.2d at 242.  
 79 Id. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80 Id. at 242. 
 81 969 A.2d 1069 (N.J. 2009). 
 82 See id. at 1071.   
 83 Id. at 1072 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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auction close.  Delivery options can be [discussed].  Payment in Full 
required within 10 days of auction close.”
85
  Finally, the advertisement 
provided an e-mail address and a phone number that belonged to 
Radir Wheels, Inc., which Richard Conklin owned.
86
 
In response to the eBay advertisement, the plaintiff placed a bid 
on the 1970 Corvette in the amount of $13,651.
87
  Shortly after plac-
ing that bid but before the online auction closed, the plaintiff spoke 
to Conklin by calling the phone number listed on the advertise-
ment.
88
  Conklin verified all of the statements in the advertisement, 
confirmed that the vehicle “was in good condition,” and stated that 
the car “could be driven from New Jersey to Missouri.”
89
  Subsequent-
ly, when the auction closed, the plaintiff’s bid won the Corvette.
90
 
Thereafter, the plaintiff contacted Conklin, but Conklin now 
told the plaintiff that “it might not be safe to drive the Corvette from 
New Jersey to Missouri” because “the automatic headlights did not 
work (although they could be raised manually), the windshield wipers 
did not work, and the car lacked a spare tire.”
91
  Conklin, however, 
never disclosed any of those problems in the advertisement or in the 
prior phone call between Conklin and the plaintiff.
92
  In light of those 
issues, the plaintiff chose to ship the Corvette to Missouri.
93
  The 
plaintiff paid for the car “with a check made payable to Conklin,” and 
the plaintiff received the title to the car directly from Conklin (al-
though the title arrived in a Radir Wheels envelope).
94
 
After the car arrived in Missouri, the plaintiff brought the Cor-
vette for an examination at a specialty repair shop.
95
  That examina-
tion revealed that 
the car’s frame was rusted nearly in half, thereby disqualifying the 
Corvette from registration in Missouri; the convertible top was in 
poor condition; the seats were ripped in various places; the driv-
er’s seat frame was broken; the radio/tape player was not original 
 
 85 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86 See id. 
 87 See Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d at 1072. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d at 1072. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See id. 
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equipment; the engine hesitated during acceleration; and the 
carburetor was out of tune.
96
 
Thus, Conklin’s advertisement for the vehicle on eBay “was not even 
close” to reflective of the car’s actual condition.
97
  After the examina-
tion, the plaintiff e-mailed Conklin, and the plaintiff insisted that he 
would never have bought the Corvette had he known its true condi-
tion.
98
 
Claiming “breach of contract, common law fraud, negligent mi-
srepresentation, violations of the [CFA], and fraudulent induce-
ment,” the plaintiff filed suit against both Conklin individually and 
Radir Wheels.
99
  The defendants denied liability.
100
  In his suit, the 
plaintiff asserted that Conklin’s false eBay advertisement induced the 
plaintiff to pay over $13,000 for a vehicle that was, at the time of the 
auction, worth between $5,000 and $8,000.
101
  To place the car in a 
safe and presentable condition, the plaintiff was forced to pay, in ad-
dition to the purchase price of $13,651, over $40,000 for professional 
repairs.
102
  And even after the professional work, the Corvette was still 
worth only $25,000–$30,000.
103
 
At trial, the court, sitting without a jury, initially dismissed all 
claims against Radir Wheels on the grounds that all of Conklin’s ac-
tions in regard to the advertisement and sale of the Corvette were 
Conklin’s alone and were not taken on behalf of Radir Wheels.
104
  
Thereafter, the court found that Conklin committed the affirmative 
act of misrepresentation, that Conklin qualified as a “dealer,” and 
that his actions, therefore, violated the CFA.
105
  Thus, after determin-
ing that the plaintiff’s ascertainable loss under the CFA was $8,651, 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 1072–73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98 See id. at 1073. 
 99 Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc., No. A-6074-04T1, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. July 6, 2007), available at http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/courts/wordperfect/ 
appellate/A6074-04.DOC.  
 100 See id. 
 101 See Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d at 1073. 
 102 See id. at 1073 & n.2. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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the trial court awarded the plaintiff $25,953 in treble damages, 
$29,950 in attorney’s fees, and $6,544.81 in costs.
106
 
Conklin appealed and alleged two grounds for error.
107
  Specifi-
cally, Conklin asserted that the trial court erred in (1) “conclud[ing] 
that, as a casual seller of used cars, Conklin nevertheless was subject 
to compliance with the CFA”; and (2) assuming that Conklin could 
not be liable under the CFA unless he was a dealer, denying, at the 
close of the plaintiff’s case, Conklin’s motion to dismiss premised on 
the assertion that the plaintiff failed to prove that Conklin was a deal-
er.
108
  Agreeing with Conklin, the appellate division reversed and 
“rul[ed] that the commercial activities of a casual seller of used auto-
mobiles do not fall within the CFA’s private civil cause of action”
109
 
and that Conklin’s motion to dismiss the CFA claim therefore 
“should have been granted because there was no evidence that Con-
klin was a ‘dealer’ or ‘merchant’ under the CFA.”
110
  The appellate di-
vision, however, held that the trial court implicitly found that Conklin 
committed common-law fraud.
111
  Therefore, the appellate panel 
upheld but modified the judgment against Conklin to an award for 
the plaintiff of $8,651, which is the amount of compensatory damages 
to which the plaintiff would be entitled under a cause of action pur-
suant to common-law fraud (rather than CFA).
112
 
On certification to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the court 
held that “giving full expression” to the CFA’s general antifraud pro-
vision’s “plain words” required the court to reverse the appellate divi-
sion’s opinion and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.
113
  The court 
began by discussing the CFA’s history and broad protective pur-
pose.
114
  The court articulated that the CFA’s general antifraud provi-
sion’s “proscriptions [are] both wide and deep” and that the CFA was 
enacted to “address sharp practices and dealings in the marketing of 
 
 106 Id.  The $8,651 amount “represent[s] the difference between the $13,651 
plaintiff paid for the Corvette and . . . $5,000,” which the trial court found to be the 
actual value at the time of the plaintiff’s purchase.  Id. 
 107 See Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d at 1074. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 1071 (emphasis added). 
 110 Id. at 1074. 
 111 See id.  
 112 See id. at 1074.  The appellate division also remanded the case to the trial court 
to determine whether Conklin should be liable for prejudgment interest on the ap-
pellate division’s new award of damages based on common-law fraud.  See id. 
 113 Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d at 1072. 
 114 See id. at 1075. 
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merchandise and real estate whereby the consumer could be victi-
mized by being lured into a purchase through fraudulent, deceptive 
or other similar kind of selling or advertising practices.”
115
  Next, the 
court demonstrated the CFA’s “wide breadth” by providing a “cursory 
survey” of the contexts in which the CFA has been applied.
116
  And fi-
nally, because the plaintiff’s claim rested on a statutory-interpretation 
issue, before moving on to apply the CFA’s general antifraud provi-
sion to the plaintiff’s claim against Conklin, the court reviewed the 
basic rules of statutory construction.
117
  Applying those statutory-
construction principles, the court held that the CFA’s general anti-
fraud provision “prohibits certain acts performed by ‘any person,’ 
and the statutory definition of ‘person’ is sufficiently expansive to 
ensnare [the] defendant,” who was an individual eBay seller.
118
 
Additionally, the court specifically held that, for purposes of as-
sessing liability under the CFA’s general antifraud provision, “it is 
immaterial whether Conklin was a ‘dealer.’”
119
  The court explained 
that the parties had mistakenly been using the term “dealer,” which 
the parties derived from the Used Car Lemon Law (UCLL).
120
  Be-
cause the UCLL specifically states that “[n]othing in this act shall in 
any way limit the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a 
consumer under any other law,”
121
 the UCLL, “by its own explicit 
terms, . . . never was intended to substitute for the CFA; on the con-
 
 115 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116 Id. at 1076.  Specifically, the court articulated that the CFA’s protections have 
been utilized in, among other contexts, all of the following examples: “undisclosed 
document fee charges on new-car purchases,” id. (citing Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, 
Inc., 964 A.2d 741 (N.J. 2009)); “residential siding products,” id. (citing Simmermon 
v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 953 A.2d 478 (N.J. 2008)); “overcharges in summary dispossess 
complaints,” id. (citing Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 915 A.2d 1 (N.J. 2007)); “overcharges 
on loan interest,” id. (citing Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 
912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006)); “arbitration of mortgage claims,” id. (citing Delta Funding 
Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104 (N.J. 2006)); “rent-to-own contracts,” id. (citing Perez v. 
Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 2006)); “car repairs,” id. (citing Ryan v. 
American Honda Motor Co., 896 A.2d 454 (N.J. 2006)); “car warranty claims,” id. 
(citing Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 872 A.2d 783 (N.J. 2005)); “carpet 
sales,” id. (citing Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 860 A.2d 435 (N.J. 2004)); and “pre-
paid phone cards,” id. (citing Smith v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 839 A.2d 850 (N.J. 
2004)).   
 117 See id. at 1077; see also infra Part V. 
 118 Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d at 1078 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1(d), -2 
(West 2001)).   
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-67 to -80 (West 2001)). 
 121 Id. (quoting § 56:8-75). 
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trary, it is additive, intended to supplement the CFA’s rights and re-
medies.”
122
  Therefore, whether an individual eBay seller qualifies as a 
“dealer” under the UCLL (or any other CFA specific antifraud provi-
sion or regulation) is irrelevant to and in no way affects the individual 
eBay seller’s potential liability under the CFA’s general antifraud pro-
vision.
123
 
V.THE NECESSITY AND CORRECTNESS OF THE RADIR WHEELS 
DECISION 
No one could reasonably argue that the CFA’s general antifraud 
provision does not apply to merchant eBay sellers.
124
  But the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey took a bold step in Radir Wheels by hold-
ing that individual sellers, who frequently transact on eBay, are sub-
ject to liability under the CFA’s general antifraud provision.
125
  No 
other state has ever explicitly provided (via statute or reported court 
holding) that its consumer-protection laws apply to individual sellers 
on eBay or other Internet-auction Web sites.
126
  And notably, in the 
 
 122 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123 Id. 
 124 A small or large business that sells items on eBay would unquestionably qualify 
as “any natural person or his legal representative, partnership, corporation, compa-
ny, trust, business entity or association.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(d).  Because such 
businesses are professional sellers attempting to distribute mass amounts of goods to 
consumers, those businesses are capable of causing recurring harm to consumers.  
See Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 648 (N.J. 1971) (stating that “deception, misre-
presentation and unconscionable practices engaged in by professional sellers seeking 
mass distribution of many types of consumer goods frequently produce an adverse 
effect on large segments of disadvantaged and poorly educated people”).  Further, a 
small or large business’s advertisement and sale of goods on eBay constitutes a “sale 
or advertisement of any merchandise,” § 56:8-2, which includes any “objects, wares, 
goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public 
for sale.”  § 56:8-1(c).  
 125 See eBay, Inc., Who We Are, supra note 10. 
 126 Notably, the court in Radir Wheels asserted that “[a]t least one state has 
amended its consumer protection statute clearly to reach such transactions.”  Real v. 
Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d 1069, 1071 n.1 (N.J. 2009) (emphasis added) (citing 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2008) (making it “unlawful for any person, 
firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof” to engage in deceptive 
advertising or other deceptive commercial practices)).  Like the CFA, California’s 
consumer-protection law, as well as many other states’ consumer-protection laws, ap-
plies to a “person” who commits an unconscionable commercial practice.  Nonethe-
less, no reported case in any state (other than Radir Wheels in New Jersey) has ever 
extended consumer-fraud liability to individual eBay sellers.  Thus, although Califor-
nia’s consumer-protection law and other states’ consumer-protection laws clearly 
could reach sales by individual eBay sellers, no state other than New Jersey has yet to 
provide for such an application. 
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only two decisions of any state even remotely involving a plaintiff as-
serting the application of a consumer-fraud statute to an individual 
eBay seller, Tennessee courts both times avoided articulating whether 
Tennessee’s Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
127
 could govern the 
transactions.
128
 
Accordingly, because the court’s holding in Radir Wheels is vitally 
important for consumers and sellers alike, the decision is simulta-
neously vehemently supported and attacked.  Some would say that 
the Radir Wheels ruling “offers tremendous protections for consumers, 
and true deterrence to people who might otherwise commit fraud.”
129
  
But others would assert that the Radir Wheels decision is an unjustified 
expansion of the CFA because now “[a]ny individual in the state who 
has a garage sale or puts something up on eBay is potentially liable 
under the [CFA].”
130
  Those who oppose the Radir Wheels ruling warn 
that “[t]his certainly opens up a multitude of other avenues for plain-
tiffs’ litigation.”
131
 
Despite any criticism, the Radir Wheels court correctly made a vi-
tal extension of the CFA’s general antifraud provision.  As the court 
in Radir Wheels properly stated, whether the CFA’s general antifraud 
provision applies to individual eBay sellers is a question of statutory 
interpretation.
132
  When engaging in statutory interpretation, a 
court’s “overarching duty is to construe and apply the statute as 
enacted.”
133
  A court must “begin[] with the plain language of the sta-
tute”
134
: 
 
 127 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-101 to -130 (West, Westlaw through 2009 First Reg. 
Sess.).  
 128 See Smith v.  Marquross, 276 S.W.3d 926, 927–28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (af-
firming the liability of defendant, an individual seller, for breach of contract and fail-
ing to articulate the reason for which plaintiff’s TCPA claim against defendant failed 
at trial level); Evans v. Matlock, No. M2001-02631-COA-R9-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 906, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2002) (addressing only procedural 
claim of plaintiff, a purchaser, that eBay arbitration clause was inapplicable to con-
sumers and failing to address plaintiff’s substantive claim that defendants, individual 
sellers, were liable under the TCPA). 
 129 Michael Booth, Court Extends Consumer Fraud Act to Internet Auction Site Transac-
tions, 196 N.J. L.J. 83, 83 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 131 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132 See Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d 1069, 1077 (N.J. 2009). 
 133 Daidone v. Buterick Bulkheading, 924 A.2d 1193, 1198 (N.J. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 134 Id. at 1198–99 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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[A] court should not resort to extrinsic interpretative aids when 
the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible 
to only one interpretation.  That said, if there is ambiguity in the 
statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpre-
tation, [a court] may turn to extrinsic evidence, including legisla-
tive history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construc-
tion. . . .  [A court] may also resort to extrinsic evidence if a plain 
reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall 
statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language.
135
 
Utilizing those principles of statutory construction, numerous 
arguments demonstrate both the correctness and importance of the 
Radir Wheels decision.  Beginning with the statutory language, the 
CFA’s general antifraud provision’s plain language unambiguously 
encompasses individual eBay sellers.  Moreover, the CFA was enacted 
with a broad protective purpose, and to adhere to that purpose, indi-
vidual eBay sellers, who are clearly capable of defrauding consumers, 
must be held accountable under the CFA because other fraud-
prevention measures and remedies are ineffective.  Furthermore, by 
analogy to an articulation by a Connecticut court applying Connecti-
cut’s consumer-protection laws in a context outside of eBay, because 
individual eBay sellers operate in a business context, individual sellers 
should be required to comply with the CFA’s standards regardless of 
how few or how many times they have previously sold items on eBay.  
And finally, the CFA should be interpreted analogically to the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC), Article 2, which applies to all sellers, 
whether individual or merchant. 
A. The CFA’s General Antifraud Provision’s Plain Language 
The correctness of the Radir Wheels decision is clear because the 
CFA’s general antifraud provision’s plain language unambiguously 
applies to individual eBay sellers.  The CFA’s general antifraud provi-
sion prohibits “[t]he act, use or employment by any person of any un-
conscionable commercial practice” or other fraud “in connection 
with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.”
136
  
Logically, an individual eBay seller qualifies as a “person” as used in 
the CFA’s general antifraud provision.
137
  The CFA further explains 
that a “person” includes “any natural person or his legal representative, 
partnership, corporation, company, trust, business entity or associa-
 
 135 Id. at 1198 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2001) (emphasis added).   
 137 Id. 
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tion, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, 
member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestuis que trustent the-
reof.”
138
  Saying that an individual eBay seller would not fall under 
this all-encompassing definition would be absurd. 
Nothing in the CFA’s general antifraud provision indicates that 
the CFA applies only to merchant sellers.  Indeed, the CFA’s general 
antifraud provision applies to “any person[’s] . . . sale or advertise-
ment of any merchandise,”
139
 which includes any “objects, wares, 
goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirect-
ly to the public for sale.”
140
  Items placed for sale on Internet-auction 
Web sites, whether by individual or merchant sellers, are subject to 
the CFA’s general antifraud provision. 
B. The Broad Protective Purpose of the CFA 
The broad protective purpose behind the CFA further proves 
that the Radir Wheels decision was a necessary extension of the CFA’s 
general antifraud provision to individual eBay sellers.  Without the 
CFA’s general antifraud provision, current e-commerce fraud-
prevention measures and remedies are insufficient to protect con-
sumers.  Further, the holdings of New Jersey courts and the courts of 
other states that articulate that consumer-protection laws do not re-
gulate individual sellers’ sales of their personal residences can be dis-
tinguished because, unlike isolated sales of residences by homeown-
ers, sales by individual eBay sellers are capable of inflicting large-scale 
harm on the consuming public.  Thus, to effectuate the CFA’s pur-
pose of preventing the risk of recurring harm to the consuming pub-
lic, the CFA must govern individual eBay sellers. 
1. Ineffectiveness of Fraud Prevention Without the CFA 
Understanding the fact that current e-commerce fraud-
prevention measures and remedies are ineffective is essential to com-
prehending why the CFA’s protective purpose necessitates applying 
the CFA’s general antifraud provision to individual eBay sellers.  Al-
though consumers who are defrauded by individual eBay sellers may 
rely on traditional causes of action, those causes of action are insuffi-
cient to protect or make whole defrauded consumers.  Further, ade-
quate causes of action specific to e-commerce have not been adopted 
 
 138 Id. § 56:8-1(d) (emphasis added).   
 139 § 56:8-2.   
 140 § 56:8-1(c). 
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to provide any added form of consumer protection.  And finally, the 
current means used by the government and Internet-auction Web 
sites to prevent fraud are ineffective to protect consumers from in-
creasing Internet fraud committed by individual sellers. 
Traditional causes of action are insufficient to protect consum-
ers who are defrauded by individual eBay sellers because, even if the 
consumer wins, the consumer usually “ha[s] his or her award or set-
tlement offset” or far surpassed “by counsel fees and costs.”
141
  Admit-
tedly, consumers do have some protection outside of the CFA from In-
ternet-auction fraud committed by individual eBay sellers.  
Consumers may rely on common-law causes of action in contract, 
tort, property,
142
 and fraud.
143
  Further, an aggrieved consumer could 
invoke application of New Jersey’s version of Article 2,
144
 which ap-
plies to all “transactions in goods,”
145
 regardless of whether the seller 
is a merchant or non-merchant, and thereby includes sales by indi-
vidual eBay sellers to consumers.
146
  But those causes of action do not 
prevent fraud; they merely repair some of the damage done by the 
fraud.  Unlike a consumer relying on the CFA, a consumer utilizing a 
claim in common-law contracts, torts, property, or fraud or based on 
New Jersey’s version of Article 2 will have to pay their own costs and 
attorney’s fees.  Because doing so would be an impossibility for some 
consumers, those consumers are barred from ever being made whole, 
and those who perpetrated the fraud reap the benefits.  A perfect ex-
ample can be found in Radir Wheels, in which the plaintiff incurred 
attorney’s fees of $29,950 and costs of $6,544.81.
147
  The average con-
sumer who is defrauded by an individual eBay seller cannot afford to 
incur such heavy expenses to recover an amount in damages when 
that amount in damages will most likely be far less than the ex-
penses.
148
 
 
 141 Booth, supra note 129, at 83. 
 142 See Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). 
 143 See, e.g., Kavky v. Herbalife Int’l of Am., 820 A.2d 677, 678–79, 685 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 144 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:2-101 to -725 (West 2004). 
 145 § 12A:2-102. 
 146 See Scott J. Burnham, Why Do Law Students Insist That Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code Applies Only to Merchants and What Can We Do About It?, 63 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1271, 1273, 1281 (1997). 
 147 See Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc., 969 A.2d 1069, 1073 (N.J. 2009). 
 148 See e.g., id. (providing that actual damages incurred by plaintiff were $8,651). 
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Although “[t]he importance of consumer protection to the de-
velopment of electronic commerce is underscored in proposed laws 
presently under consideration which address commercial transactions 
in cyberspace,”
149
 those proposed laws offer e-commerce consumers 
no protection because the laws are merely proposed.  Two proposed 
but unadopted laws are noteworthy.  First, the American Law Institute 
(ALI) created a revised version of Article 2, which includes a pro-
posed subpart (Subpart 2B) that both explicitly makes clear that Ar-
ticle 2 governs the electronic sale of goods and provides additional 
laws that apply specifically to such electronic sales of goods.
150
  
Second, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
has also demonstrated its concern for consumer protection in e-
commerce through its promulgation of a Model Electronic Com-
merce Act, which sets forth specific provisions that afford protection 
to consumers.
151
  Nonetheless, these laws fail to protect Internet con-
sumers because they have not been adopted, and even if the laws 
were to be adopted, they ultimately offer no more protection to con-
 
 149 3 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: TREATISE WITH FORMS 31-2 
(2001). 
 150 See DAVID BAUMER & J.C. POINDEXTER, CYBERLAW AND E-COMMERCE: SECURITY, 
RISK MANAGEMENT, AND CONTROL 57 (2002).  The ALI, however, never approved 
Subpart 2B for incorporation into a revised version of the UCC.  See Kenneth L. Car-
son & Gail E. Horowitz, Software and Computer Law: Old Questions to Be Answered in the 
New Millennium, BOSTON B.J., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 10, 22–23.  Thereafter, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created two new proposed 
uniform state laws—the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) 
and the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (UETA)—both of which were, in part, 
derived from Subpart 2B.  See BAUMER & POINDEXTER, supra, at 57–58, 60.  Although 
the UCITA does include specific consumer-protection provisions, the UCITA go-
verns the licensing of electronic information.  See id. at 58; 3 BALLON, supra note 149, 
at 31-3.  Thus, the UCITA is inapplicable to the vast majority of eBay transactions, 
which deal with the sale of goods.  See BAUMER & POINDEXTER, supra, at 57.  Addition-
ally, although the UETA would govern eBay transactions, it has little bearing on the 
issue of the applicability of consumer-protection laws because it deals not with the 
substantive law of electronic transactions but governs procedural issues such as en-
suring that electronic records, including e-mails, would satisfy the statute of frauds 
where satisfaction thereof would be required to enforce a contract.  See id. at 60–61.  
Presently, no state has adopted Subpart 2B, see CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN 
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1067 (6th ed. 2007); two states (Maryland and 
Virginia) have adopted the UCITA, see Warren E. Agin & Scott N. Kumis, A Framework 
for Understanding Electronic Information Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 277, 284 
n.16 (2005); and forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Isl-
ands have adopted the UETA, see Unif. Law Comm’rs, A Few Facts About the Uni-
form Electronic Transactions Act, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/ 
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited October 18, 2009). 
 151 See 3 BALLON, supra note 149, at 31-3. 
DIGGS (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  5:01 PM 
834 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:811 
 
sumers from individual eBay sellers than is provided by traditional 
causes of action, which ultimately fail to protect or make whole de-
frauded consumers.
152
 
Finally, consumers need the CFA to deter consumer fraud by in-
dividual eBay sellers because individual eBay sellers are not sufficient-
ly halted from committing fraud by government and Internet-auction 
Web site fraud-prevention measures.  Although a consumer could re-
port to eBay a fraudulent sale through eBay’s Resolution Center, 
eBay would only investigate the claim and potentially issue “discipli-
nary actions rang[ing] from formal warnings or temporary account 
restrictions to indefinite suspension of a member’s account.”
153
  But 
individual eBay sellers who commit Internet-auction fraud are not de-
terred by warnings, account restrictions, or suspensions.  Scammers 
would continue to perpetrate fraud and, at most, would be inconve-
nienced by having to create a new account.  Moreover, the govern-
ment’s e-commerce fraud-prevention measures do not protect con-
sumers.  Countless commentators have criticized the failure of the 
government’s current means of fraud prevention and have stressed 
the need for, among other things, more extensive state and federal 
regulation and improved consumer education.
154
 
2. Distinction from Personal Real-Estate Sales 
The CFA’s general antifraud provision’s application to individu-
al eBay sellers can be distinguished from the New Jersey judiciary’s 
decisions in Neveroski v. Blair
155
 and Di Bernardo v. Mosley,
156
 which both 
 
 152 See supra notes 141–48 and accompanying text. 
 153 eBay, What To Do When You Don’t Receive Your Item or It’s Not as Described, 
supra note 15. 
 154 See, e.g., RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 304 (2d ed. 
2005); Mary M. Calkins, Comment, My Reputation Always Had More Fun Than Me: The 
Failure of eBay’s Feedback Model to Effectively Prevent Online Auction Fraud, 7 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 33 (2001), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i4/note1.html; Hynes, supra note 
22; James M. Snyder, Note, Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They 
Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 453 (2000).   
 155 358 A.2d 473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2001), as stated in Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 955 A.2d 940, 
952 n.9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (“Neveroski was abrogated on other grounds 
by the 1976 statutory amendment adding ‘the sale or advertisement of . . . real estate’ 
to the provisions of [the CFA’s general antifraud provision].”).  Neveroski held that 
the CFA did not apply to any real-estate transactions, regardless of whether the seller 
was an individual or a merchant, because the CFA’s general antifraud provision prior 
to the 1976 amendment stated that the CFA applied to transactions in merchandise, 
but it was silent in regard to transactions in real estate.  See Di Bernardo v. Mosley, 
502 A.2d 1166, 1168 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).  The 1976 amendment super-
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held that the CFA does not govern an individual seller’s sale of his 
personal residence.  The courts in both Neveroski and Di Bernardo ex-
plained that the CFA was intended to prevent the public harm caused 
by the unconscionable acts of “‘professional sellers seeking mass dis-
tribution of many types of consumer goods,’ . . . not . . . the isolated 
sale of a single family residence by its owner.”
157
  Notably, all other states 
but one addressing the issue have also specifically held that their con-
sumer-fraud statutes do not regulate an individual seller’s sale of his 
personal residence.
158
 
But unlike a homeowner selling his own dwelling, whose fraud 
will not be a recurring threat to consumers and, therefore, will have 
no significant impact on the general public, individual eBay sellers 
clearly are capable of committing recurring fraudulent acts against 
consumers.
159
  Undeniably, eBay is a consumer marketplace
160
 because 
eBay enables worldwide trade among a diverse community of individ-
 
seded Neveroski only insofar as the amendment made clear that the CFA’s general an-
tifraud provision also applies to transactions in real estate.  See id.  But the 1976 
amendment made no assertion as to whether the CFA would apply to individual sel-
lers of real estate in addition to its patent application to merchant sellers.  See id.  
Consequently, Neveroski’s reasoning as to why the CFA does not apply to an individual 
seller’s sale of his personal residence is still valid law, which is evidenced by New Jer-
sey courts’ continued reliance on Neveroski in rejecting the notion that the 1976 
amendment brought all transactions in real estate under the purview of the CFA.  See 
id. 
 156 502 A.2d 1166.   
 157 Id. at 1168 (emphasis added) (quoting Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 647–48 
(N.J. 1971)). 
 158 Most states have held that their consumer-fraud statutes do not apply to the 
isolated real-estate transaction of a homeowner selling his residence.  See, e.g., Young 
v. Joyce 351 A.2d 857, 860 (Del. 1975) (stating that the Delaware Consumer Fraud 
Act does not apply to a homeowner’s sale of his own residence); Zeeman v. Black, 
273 S.E.2d 910, 914, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that the Georgia Fair Business 
Practices Act does not apply to a homeowner’s sale of his own residence); Zimmer-
man v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409, 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding 
that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to a homeowner’s sale of his 
own residence); Lantner v. Carson, 373 N.E.2d 973, 974–77 (Mass. 1978) (articulat-
ing that the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act does not apply to a homeown-
er’s sale of his own residence); Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tenn. 
1997) (stating that the TCPA does not apply to a homeowner’s sale of his own resi-
dence).  Apparently, only one state has held that its consumer-fraud statue applies to 
an individual homeowner’s sale of his own residence.  See Gabriel v. O’Hara 534 A.2d 
488, 489–93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Prac-
tices and Consumer Protection Law applies to a  homeowner’s sale of his own resi-
dence).   
 159 See Zeeman, 273 S.E.2d at 915. 
 160 See id.  
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ual buyers and sellers as well as small and large businesses.
161
  And 
those fraudulent acts or omissions by individual eBay sellers are and 
will continue to be recurring threats that impact the general consum-
ing public
162
 because individual eBay sellers can easily engage in fraud 
through material misrepresentations or omissions.
163
  The unwary 
eBay consumer, who is often separated by hundreds or thousands of 
miles from the individual seller and item for sale, cannot conduct a 
firsthand inspection prior to purchasing the product on which the 
consumer is bidding.  Consequently, the consumer must rely on the 
individual eBay seller to accurately and truthfully represent the item. 
Although an individual who sells his home has no more bargain-
ing power than any given consumer,
164
 the same cannot be said for an 
individual eBay seller.  While selling his residence, the individual sel-
ler regularly allows consumers inside to inspect the home prior to the 
sale; while selling an item on eBay, the individual seller can effortless-
ly misrepresent his goods to the entirety of the World Wide Web from 
the comfort of his living room without ever facing inspection or in-
quisition until after he commits the fraudulent sale.  Indeed, the 
simplicity of committing Internet-auction fraud has resulted in eBay 
scammers repeatedly taking advantage of bidding consumers.
165
  The 
fact that individual sellers account for eighty-four percent of all In-
ternet-auction fraud
166
 further demonstrates that individual eBay sel-
lers pose a recurring threat capable of impacting the consumer pub-
lic’s
167
 millions of Internet-auction transactions each day.
168
  
Consequently, sales by individual eBay sellers can be distinguished 
from a homeowner’s private sale of his home in that eBay sales are 
much more “public.”
169
 
3. The CFA’s Protective Purpose 
Because other e-commerce fraud-prevention measures and re-
medies are incapable of providing security to eBay consumers, who 
 
 161 eBay, Inc., Who We Are, supra note 11. 
 162 See Zeeman, 273 S.E.2d at 915. 
 163 See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text. 
 164 See Lantner v. Carson, 373 N.E.2d 973, 977 (Mass. 1978). 
 165 See Fortunato, supra note 15; INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., supra note 16, at 
5. 
 166 See INTERNET FRAUD COMPLAINT CTR., supra note 5, at 10. 
 167 See Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). 
 168 See eBay, Inc., Who We Are, supra note 11. 
 169 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(c) (West 2001). 
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purchase in an environment vastly different from individuals purchas-
ing personal residences, the CFA’s protective purpose necessitates ex-
tension of the CFA’s general antifraud provision to individual eBay 
sellers.  New Jersey courts have stated that, as a remedial statute, the 
CFA’s provisions must be construed liberally to protect the consum-
er.
170
  And the burden of ensuring consumer protection through ef-
fective use of the provisions provided by the CFA does not fall solely 
on the shoulders of the Division of Consumer Affairs or the legisla-
ture.
171
 
Whether [consumer-protection statutes] will adequately protect 
consumers’ rights is largely dependent upon the range of wrongs 
[consumer-protection statutes] combat. . . .  [A consumer-
protection statute’s] ultimate success in novel situations may de-
pend upon broad judicial interpretation.  With that approach [a 
consumer-protection statute] may provide the vehicle for explor-
ing new and uncharted areas of consumer fraud.
172
 
Accordingly, the judiciary has consistently adopted a broad interpre-
tation of the CFA to give its remedial provisions their greatest possi-
ble effect.
173
 
The situation in Radir Wheels was no exception.  Unlike individu-
als who sell their personal residences, individual eBay sellers pose a 
significant, recurring threat to the consuming public.
174
  Moreover, 
current remedies and e-commerce fraud-prevention measures are 
obviously insufficient to protect individual eBay sellers’ consumer vic-
tims.
175
  The court boldly carried the CFA in a direction demanded by 
the novel situation created by individual eBay sellers “exploring new 
and uncharted areas of consumer fraud.”
176
  Thus, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey continued its tradition of broad interpretation of the 
 
 170 See Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 741 A.2d 591, 593 (N.J. 1999). 
 171 See Bossemeyer, supra note 25, at 49. 
 172 Note, Consumer Remedies—Statutes—A New Approach—Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch 
93A (Supp. 1969); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1969), 1 SETON HALL L. REV. 208, 212–13 
(1970) [hereinafter A New Approach]. 
 173 See Bossemeyer, supra note 25, at 49–51; see e.g., Int’l Union of Operating Engi-
neers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929 A.2d 1076, 1079 n.1 (N.J. 
2007) (stating that despite disclaiming that the court reserved judgment for a case in 
which the issue was presented to the court, plaintiff, a “joint union-employer” and 
New Jersey corporation, presumably qualified as a “consumer” under CFA, which 
does not define “consumer,” because the CFA has “been repeatedly recognized to be 
remedial legislation which should be construed liberally”). 
 174 See supra Part V.B.2. 
 175 See supra Part V.B.1. 
 176 A New Approach, supra note 172, at 213. 
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CFA according to the statute’s expansive remedial purpose by taking 
a necessary step to provide adequate protection for the eBay market-
place. 
C. Selling on eBay Constitutes Making a Sale in a Business Context 
The Radir Wheels decision gains further support via an assess-
ment of individual eBay sellers’ actions through the lens of Connecti-
cut’s consumer-protection laws, which hold liable any fraudulent ac-
tor in a business context.  Although New Jersey courts have never 
held that where a transaction takes place in a business context it the-
reby falls under the purview of the CFA, a Connecticut court’s hold-
ing that any and all transactions that take place in a business context 
are governed by Connecticut’s consumer-protection laws should be 
used as persuasive authority to support application of the CFA’s gen-
eral antifraud provision to individual eBay sellers. 
Connecticut’s consumer-protection law, the Connecticut Unfair 
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
177
 contains broad language that pro-
vides that “[n]o person shall engage in . . . unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”
178
  In Duncan v. 
PEH I, the plaintiff, administratrix of her son’s estate, brought suit 
against two hotel companies on the grounds of negligence and viola-
tion of the CUTPA in connection with her son’s drowning in the ho-
tel’s pool.
179
  Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants’ al-
legedly negligent acts and omissions that encouraged her son’s use of 
the pool, which led to his death, constituted deceptive business prac-
tices in violation of the CUTPA.
180
  The defendants moved to dismiss 
the CUTPA claim for failure to state a claim on which relief could be 
granted.
181
  The court held that the “CUTPA is an expansive remedial 
statute that, by its own terms, applies to a broad spectrum of com-
mercial activity, and, therefore, it should be liberally construed.”
182
  
Consequently, the court found that “under a CUTPA claim, a transac-
tion need not take place in the defendant’s ordinary course of business 
 
 177 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110a to -110q (West, Westlaw through Sept. 2009 
Spec. Sess.). 
 178 § 42-110b(a). 
 179 See No. CV020817088S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1020, at *1–2 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 1, 2003).  
 180 See id. at *2–3. 
 181 See id. 
 182 Id. at *8. 
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so long as it takes place in a ‘business context.’”
183
  Thus, the court con-
cluded that maintaining and advertising a hotel pool falls under the 
purview of selling accommodations, and therefore, the plaintiff’s 
CUTPA claim should not be dismissed.
184
 
The court’s holding in Duncan means that under the CUTPA, 
even where a seller engages in only a single transaction in a given 
business context, that seller’s actions in that sale are still governed by 
the CUTPA.  And if the phrase “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in the conduct of any trade or commerce”
185
 brings all transactions in 
a business context under the purview of the CUTPA, then certainly 
the language “any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, 
[or] fraud . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any 
merchandise or real estate”
186
 similarly permits the CFA to regulate all 
transactions in a business context.  Moreover, e-commerce is defined 
as “the consolidation of technology, material, people, and processes 
on an electronic network for commercial transactions.”
187
  E-commerce 
transactions, which include transactions through eBay,
188
 obviously 
take place in a business context.
189
  Thus, because the CFA is at least 
as protective as the CUTPA, the Connecticut court’s holding in Dun-
can supports the notion that the Radir Wheels court correctly extended 
CFA liability to individual eBay sellers, whose transactions undoub-
tedly take place in a business context, even if the sale is not in the sel-
lers’ ordinary courses of business. 
D. Parallel to UCC 
The similarities between the CFA and the language, intent, and 
structure of Article 2, which applies to merchants and non-merchants 
(including individual eBay sellers), analogically indicate that the Ra-
dir Wheels court correctly concluded that the CFA’s general antifraud 
provision applies to both individual and merchant eBay sellers.  Be-
cause Article 2’s broad language applies to both merchants and non-
merchants, the CFA’s similarly broad language should be interpreted 
 
 183 Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 
 184 See id. at *19. 
 185 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b(a) (West, Westlaw through Sept. 2009 Spec. 
Sess.). 
 186 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2001). 
 187 DAVID JOHNSTON ET AL., CYBERLAW: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DOING 
BUSINESS ONLINE 37 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 188 See Sayeedi v. Walser, 835 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2007). 
 189 See Duncan, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1020, at *9. 
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to govern both individual and merchant sellers.  Further, just as the 
legislature intended for Article 2 to focus on merchants but nonethe-
less to regulate both merchants and non-merchants, the legislature 
correspondingly intended the CFA to concentrate on merchant sel-
lers but still apply to individual eBay sellers.  And finally, the CFA’s 
specific antifraud provisions, which dictate explicit standards to cer-
tain sellers in given commercial settings, parallel the way in which Ar-
ticle 2 regulates both merchants and non-merchants but subjects 
merchants to higher standards. 
1. Comparison of the Legislative Intent Behind and the 
Plain Language of the CFA and Article 2 
Comparison to Article 2’s uncontested application to both mer-
chants and non-merchants proves that the Radir Wheels court properly 
ruled that the CFA’s general antifraud provision’s unambiguous plain 
language governs both merchant and individual eBay sellers.  Article 
2 applies to all “transactions in goods,”
190
 and even though Article 2 
never explicitly uses the word “non-merchant,” Article 2’s provisions 
govern both merchant and non-merchant sellers.
191
  Although Article 
2 intentionally places an emphasis on merchants through the several 
provisions that specifically apply only to or impute a higher level of 
duty on merchants,
192
 Article 2 in its entirety was intended to govern 
merchants and non-merchants by “simplifying, clarifying, and mod-
ernizing the law that governs commercial transactions, to foster the 
expansion of commercial practices[,] and to promote uniformity of 
the law.”
193
  Notably, when the ALI developed Article 2’s revised ver-
sion, the ALI created proposed Subpart 2B.
194
  In Subpart 2B, the ALI 
explains that Article 2 regulates the electronic sale of goods and deli-
neates numerous additional provisions that apply specifically to such 
 
 190 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-102 (West 2004). 
 191 See Burnham, supra note 146, at 1273, 1281 (“Article 2 covers all transactions in 
goods, regardless of the sophistication of the parties who enter the transaction.  Ar-
ticle 2 covers transactions in which one party is a merchant, transactions between 
merchants, consumer transactions, and transactions between two nonmerchants.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 192 See infra Part V.D.2. 
 193 Jennifer B. Cannata, Note, Time is Running Out for Customized Software: Resolving 
the Good Versus Service Controversy for Year 2000 Contractual Disputes, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
283, 305 (1999). 
 194 See BAUMER & POINDEXTER, supra note 150, at 57. 
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electronic sales of goods;
195
 however, Subpart 2B has not been 
adopted by New Jersey or any other state.
196
 
Much like Article 2, the CFA’s general antifraud provision is 
extraordinarily broad.  The general antifraud provision prohibits 
“any person” from engaging in “any unconscionable commercial 
practice . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any mer-
chandise or real estate.”
197
  The CFA then further defines “any per-
son” to include “any natural person or . . . business entity or associa-
tion.”
198
  Furthermore, New Jersey courts have stated that the CFA 
must be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose of pro-
tecting the consumer.
199
 
If the phrase all “transactions in goods”
200
 brings under the pur-
view of Article 2 both merchants and non-merchants, then certainly 
the Radir Wheels court correctly held that the phrase “any natural per-
son or . . . business entity or association” engaged in selling or adver-
tising merchandise or real estate
201
 includes under the umbrella of 
the CFA both merchant eBay sellers and individual eBay sellers.  Ar-
ticle 2 may even be less inclusive than the CFA.  The CFA governs the 
sale and advertisement of real estate, which Article 2 does not.
202
  
Moreover, the CFA’s stated purpose, which is to liberally ensure con-
sumer protection,
203
 is broader than Article 2’s stated purpose, which 
is to ensure certainty in contract and commercial law.
204
 
2. Comparison of the CFA’s and UCC’s Double Standards 
Evaluating the relationship of the statutory structures of Article 2 
and the CFA demonstrates the correctness of the Radir Wheels court’s 
articulation that the CFA’s general antifraud provision applies to in-
dividual eBay sellers.  Because the CFA’s general antifraud provision 
always applies and the CFA’s numerous regulations and specific anti-
 
 195 See id. 
 196 See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 150, at 1067; see also supra Part V.B.1. 
 197 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2001).   
 198 Id. § 56:8-1(d). 
 199 See Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 741 A.2d 591, 593 (N.J. 1999). 
 200 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-102 (West 2004). 
 201 § 56:8-1(d). 
 202 See Amelia H. Boss, Panacea or Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U. L. REV. 39, 
44 n.31 (1984) (stating that “the structure of Article 2 excludes . . . sales of securities, 
intangibles, and real estate”). 
 203 See Lettenmaier, 741 A.2d at 593. 
 204 See Cannata, supra note 191, at 305.  
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fraud provisions govern only certain types of sellers in particular situ-
ations, the CFA invokes a double standard that strongly resembles the 
way in which Article 2 governs both merchants and non-merchants 
but holds merchants to higher standards. 
Article 2 explicitly distinguishes between merchants and non-
merchants.  Under Article 2, a merchant is 
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom 
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of 
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation 
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
205
 
Thus, any party who does not fall under Article 2’s definition of a 
merchant constitutes a non-merchant.  Although most of Article 2’s 
provisions govern all parties, merchant or non-merchant, to any 
transaction in goods,
206
 a number of Article 2’s provisions either go-
vern only merchants or impose more stringent requirements and 
burdens on merchants.
207
 
Similarly, the CFA’s general antifraud provision contains broad 
language that makes unlawful “any person[’s]” engagement  in “any 
unconscionable commercial practice . . . in connection with the sale 
or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate.”
208
  But the CFA 
also contains numerous regulations and specific antifraud provisions 
 
 205 § 12A:2-104(1).  
 206 Id. § 12A:2-102. 
 207 See id. § 12A:2-608 (Official Comments) (stating that “[f]ollowing the general 
policy of this Article, the requirements . . . are less stringent in the case of a non-
merchant” than in case of merchant); Chris Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in 
Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1499–1500 n.17 (1984) (re-
viewing LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 
(1983)) (stating that “[i]n general, the provisions of article 2 apply to all transactions 
in goods . . . and it is the exceptional provision that applies only to merchants” and 
providing examples of provisions specifically applicable only to merchants); see, e.g., § 
12A:2-205 (imposing more stringent firm-offer requirements on merchants); id. § 
12A:2-207(2)(a) (providing that for merchants, under certain circumstances addi-
tional terms in an acceptance become part of the contract); id. § 12A:2-312(3) (stat-
ing that “a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants 
that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person”); id. § 
12A:2-314(1) (providing that “warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is im-
plied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of 
that kind”); id. § 12A:2-603(1) (stating that “a merchant buyer is under a duty after 
rejection of goods in his possession or control to follow any reasonable instructions 
received from the seller”). 
 208 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2001); see also supra Part III.A.1. 
DIGGS (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  5:01 PM 
2010] COMMENT 843 
 
that apply only to certain sellers in the particular commercial settings 
designated by each regulation or specific antifraud provision.
209
 
The CFA regulations and specific antifraud provisions implicitly 
invoke a double standard for individual sellers and merchant sellers 
strikingly similar to Article 2’s double standard for merchants and 
non-merchants.  Many of Article 2’s provisions apply only to or re-
quire a higher standard of action from merchants, and the remainder 
of Article 2’s provisions, which contain no such designation or limita-
tion, apply to both merchants and non-merchants.
210
  Corresponding-
ly, the CFA’s regulations and specific antifraud provisions impute 
particular requirements to the sellers subject to those regulations and 
specific antifraud provisions.
211
  For each CFA regulation and specific 
antifraud provision, the sellers to whom that regulation or specific 
antifraud provision applies effectively are deemed, for purposes of 
comparison to Article 2’s double standard, merchants. 
But like many of Article 2’s provisions, the CFA’s general anti-
fraud provision contains no such designation of or limitation on the 
sellers that it governs.
212
  Consequently, the CFA’s general antifraud 
provision should be interpreted by way of comparison to the Article 2 
provisions that contain no limitation on their application and thereby 
govern both merchants and non-merchants.  Based on analogy to 
those unrestricted Article 2 provisions, the Radir Wheels court proper-
ly construed the CFA’s general antifraud provision to regulate all sel-
lers, both individual and merchant. 
VI.CONCLUSION 
Continuing technological advances require the judiciary to in-
terpret and apply established laws to comport with new, unantici-
pated situations.  Such a dilemma existed in regard to the applicabili-
ty of the CFA’s general antifraud provision to individual sellers’ 
Internet-auction sales through Web sites such as eBay.  But in Radir 
Wheels, the Supreme Court of New Jersey became the first court of any 
 
 209 See supra Part III.A.2–3.  Notably, the CFA regulations and specific antifraud 
provisions apply alongside the CFA’s general antifraud provision.  See id.  Therefore, 
for each commercial transaction to which a CFA regulation or specific antifraud pro-
vision could pertain, the CFA’s general antifraud provision always applies, even 
where the CFA regulation’s or specific antifraud provision’s explicit requirements to 
govern are not satisfied.  See id. 
 210 See supra notes 191, 207 and accompanying text. 
 211 See supra Part III.A.2–3. 
 212 See supra Part III.A.1. 
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state to explicitly extend liability under a consumer-protection law to 
individual eBay sellers.   
The court in Radir Wheels certainly reached the correct decision.  
The CFA’s general antifraud provision’s unambiguous plain lan-
guage, the need for the CFA to remain true to its broadly protective 
purpose, the fact that eBay sales occur in a business context, and 
analogy to Article 2’s governance of merchants and non-merchants 
all demonstrate that the CFA’s general antifraud provision must apply 
to individual eBay sellers.  Consequently, as the reasons for which the 
CFA has long been and will continue to be known as one of the most 
consumer-friendly consumer-protection laws in the United States ex-
pand, Radir Wheels will ensure clarity of the law in the face of eBay’s 
evolving and increasingly popular commercial sphere. 
 
